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Comment: Land Use Takings and the Problem of 
Ripeness in the United States Supreme Court Cases 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under their constitutionally granted police powers, individual 
states may regulate the use and development of privately owned land.1 
With this authority, state land use laws are often implemented at 
county and city government levels.2 Local zoning ordinances of various 
types are used to control land development and preserve environmental 
integrity. 3 
A natural tension frequently exists between government land use 
objectives and landowner development goals. Community-wide develop-
I. Generally, states have the power to implement land use policies: 
Broadly speaking, planning and zoning laws or regulations are based on, or constitute 
an application or exercise of, the police power to enact laws for the safety, health, 
morals, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare of the people, and they 
have been said to be authorized only under such power. 
lOlA C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning§ 9 (1979). 
The police power is defined in BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979) as: 
An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amend-
ment, U.S. Const., upon the individual states, and, in turn delegated to local 
governments. . . . 
The power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property 
rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the pro-
motion of the public convenience and general prosperity. 
2. The power of local governments to enact zoning regulations is not inherent, but must be 
derived from constitutional or statutory provisions: 
The original zoning power of the state resides in the state legislature, and that 
power may be delegated to governmental agencies and political subdivisions of the state. 
A municipality, county, town, or village has no inherent power to promulgate or enact 
zoning regulations; its power to accomplish zoning exists by virtue of authority dele-
gated by the state, and such power may be exercised only when it is expressly conferred 
on the municipality. . . So, it has been held that zoning regulations may not be 
adopted or enforced without specific legislative or constitutional authorization . 
lOlA C.J.S Zoning and Land Planning§ 8 (1979). 
3. Land use ordinances are used for many purposes: 
Broadly stated, the purpose of a zoning ordinance is to limit, restrict, and regulate 
the use of land in the interest of the public welfare, or to control and regulate the 
utilization, growth, and development of land within a certain locality .... The essen-
tial object or purpose of zoning regulations is to stabilize the use or uses, or the occu-
pancy, of property. In addition, the object of zoning is to stabilize a neighborhood or 
the property values in a neighborhood, to preserve the character of the community, and 
to preserve the character of neighborhoods by uniform and limited use thereof in the 
interest of the public generally. 
lOlA C.J.S Zoning and Land Planning§ 4 (1979). 
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ment plans in many instances impose environmental, aesthetic, and 
spacing requirements on land use and development. Though the pur-
poses of most planning and zoning ordinances are beneficent towards 
the public as a whole, these purposes often directly conflict with profit-
able development of private land. As might be expected, landowners 
have launched numerous legal attacks on such land use laws and 
regulations. 4 
Many challenges to government action in the land use context al-
lege that government regulations have resulted in uncompensated "tak-
ings" of private property prohibited by the fifth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 11 Takings of property under the fifth 
amendment are typically associated with the power of eminent domain. 
The exercise of this power involves an actual passing of title from the 
private landowner to the government. 6 In contrast, when zoning or 
other governmental regulation deprives a landowner of the use and/or 
value of his land, no actual transfer of title occurs. In this circumstance, 
the landowner must allege that government regulation has had the ef 
feet of an actual taking, i.e., that government has so interfered with the 
use and enjoyment of property as to deprive its owner of any economic 
interest therein. This cause of action is commonly referred to as "in-
4. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985); Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986); Hall v. City of Santa 
Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1986); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 
1986); and Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
5. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This same provi-
sion is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. 
as: 
6. According to BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979), eminent domain is defined 
The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and 
private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public 
character .... 
The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organiza-
tion, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of 
the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good. Thus, in 
time of war or insurrection, the proper authorities may possess and hold any part of the 
territory of the state for the common safety; and in time of peace the legislature may 
authorize the appropriation of the same to public purposes, such as the opening of 
roads, construction of defenses, or providing channels for trade or travel. Eminent do-
main is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in 
the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives a right to resume 
the possession of the property in the manner directed by the constitution and the laws 
of the state, whenever the public interest requires it. 
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verse condemnation,"7 and is specifically designed to challenge govern-
mental actions that result in "regulatory takings. " 8 
In one form or another, the question whether government has 
"taken" private property through the exercise of zoning laws or similar 
land use regulations has reached the United States Supreme Court sev-
eral times in recent years. 9 In all but one of these cases, however, the 
Court failed to fully reach the merits of the taking question. 10 In two of 
7. Inverse condemnation is defined as "laJ cause of action against a government agency to 
recover the value of property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise of the power of 
eminent domain has been completed." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979). 
8. Regulatory taking, or land use taking, are terms used to refer to the effective taking of 
some use or value in private property resulting from a government regulation. Land use taking 
specifically refers to regulatory impact on land use. The inquiry which accompanies any fifth 
amendment takings claim mnsists of two general questions: I) has government effected a taking; 
and 2) did government provide just compensation? 
9. Seven recent cases that have presented the land use takings issue in one form or another 
are Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 86-133 (U.S. June 26, 1987); First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 85-1199, Slip Op. (U.S. Supreme 
Court June 9, 1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. 
Mar. 9, 1987)(No. 85-1092); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 
(1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 
(1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); and Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
10. In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 86-133 (U.S. June 26, 1987) the Court re-
cently found that the derision by California officials to grant a building permit to the appellant on 
the condition that they grant a public usage over their beachfront property was invalidated as an 
improper use of police power. The Court held that a condition placed on private development is 
unconstitutional if it "utterly fails" to further the end of the governmental action. Note that the 
Supreme Court did reach the takings issue in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) 
insofar as the Court determined that the land use ordinance "on its face" did not effect a taking. 
The Court, however, did not determine the issue with respect to its applied effect upon the plain-
tiff, nor did it reach the issue of just compensation. 
In Agins, an owner of extremely valuable property just north of San Francisco alleged that a 
change in the city zoning ordinance had the effect of taking his property without just compensation 
in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The change in the 
ordinance reduced the allowable density on the landowner's property to one unit per acre. The 
landowner alleged that this change adversely impacted upon his expectation interests. Because the 
ordinance still allowed the development of up to five residences on the five acre lot, the Court 
found that "on its fare," the ordinance could not effect a taking. 
The Court did not, however, consider the constitutionality of the ordinance as it applied to 
the landowner's expected use of the land. The Court stated that "because the [landowners] have 
not submitted a plan for development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet not 
concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions." ld. at 260. Be-
cause it held that the issue was not ripe, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the constitution-
ality of the ordinance "as applied" to the land. 
In San Diego, 450 U.S. at 621, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company alleged that the 
city had taken its property without just compensation in violation of the federal and state constitu-
tions. It claimed that the city's rezoning and adoption of an open-space plan prevented it from 
constructing a nuclear power plant on the property thus depriving it of nearly all beneficial use of 
its property. Without reaching the merits, however, the Court determined that the trial court had 
failed to resolve all the factual disputes related to the takings issue. Consequently, the Court 
dismissed the appeal on jurisdirtional grounds because a final judgment by the highest state court, 
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the cases/1 the Court found the issue to be nonjusticiable on ripeness 
grounds. 12 As a consequence of the Court's decisions, many landowners 
have been unsuccessful in obtaining review of state and local land use 
ordinances. 13 
This comment identifies the unique relationship that exists be-
as required by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) was lacking. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) grants 
jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court only when "[f]inal judgments or decrees [are] 
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had ... " 
The San Diego case is also of significance because of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, 
supported by three other justices, which addressed the takings issue on the merits. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Rehnquist, who voted for the majority on the final judgment issue, stated 
"[i]f I were satisfied that this appeal was from a 'final judgment or decree' ... I would have little 
difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." 450 
U.S. at 634-35. Therefore, five of the justices at that time appear to have given their support for 
Justice Brennan's conclusion that just compensation is required "for the period commencing on 
the date the regulation first effected a 'taking', and ending on the date the government entity 
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." /d. at 659. The dissenters' position in San 
Diego was recently affirmed by a majority of the courts in First English Evangelical Luthran 
Church of Glendale vs. County of Los Angeles, California, 85-1199, Slip Op. (U.S. Supreme 
Court June 9, 1987.) In Lutheran Church, the property owner (a church) alleged in state court 
that the county of Los Angeles had taken its property by means of a restrictive flood control 
ordinance. The Church sought damages as relief for the alleged regulatory taking. Relying on 
Agins the California courts held that regardless of the correctness of the Church's claim, the claim 
could not be heard because damages were unavailable to redress a temporary regulatory taking. 
The issue which reached the Supreme Court was thus not whether a taking had occurred but 
whether monetary damages were constitutionally required. The court held that this claim was 
sufficiently final and went on to hold that a state cannot deny damages that occur to a landowner 
prior to the ultimate judicial determination that a taking has occurred. However, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, was clear in limiting the holding of Lutheran Church to the 
facts of the case at hand and in distinguishing the Lutheran Church facts from "The Case of 
Normal Delays in Obtaining Building Permits, Changes in Zoning Ordinances, Variances, and 
the Like .... "(Slip Op. at 16.) See Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Reg-
ulatory Takings", 8 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 517, 534 (1981). 
In a modern day version of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court 
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987)(No. 
85-1 092) facially addressed the takings question. In a suit alleging that Section 4 of Pennsyvania's 
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), which prohibits coal mining that 
causes subsidence damage to surface structures, effected a taking of appellant's right to mine coal 
from part of his property, the Court found that no taking had occurred inasmuch as the Act on its 
face was constitutional. In language similar to that in Agins, 447 U.S. at 255, the Court quoted 
the District Court by stating that "because plaintiffs have not alleged any injury due to the en-
forcement of the statute, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the 
specific provisions and regulations. Thus, the only question before this court is whether the mere 
enactment of the statutes and regulations constitutes a taking." Id. at 21. 
11. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3108; and MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2561. 
12. The ripeness doctrine generally requires that a case be sufficiently concrete in alleging an 
actual injury before it can be determined on the merits. If an injury has not occurred, the plain-
tiffs claim is said to be unripe. This is generally a constitutional requirement under article III 
which does not allow courts to make general advisory opinions in the absence of a real case or 
controversy. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). 
13. See, e.g., Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); and HMK Corp. v. 
County of Chesterfield, 616 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
375] RIPENESS IN TAKING ISSUES 379 
tween the land use takings issue and the doctrine of ripeness, a rela-
tionship which makes land use takings cases especially vulnerable to 
ripeness attacks. It then shows how the Supreme Court applied the 
ripeness doctrine to the facts of two recent land use decisions, William-
son County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank14 and 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County. 111 The comment also 
distinguishes these two cases and criticizes the Court for extending the 
Williamson ripeness approach to the substantially different facts of 
MacDonald. Finally, the comment looks at the practical problems of 
the current ripeness approach to land use takings cases as developed in 
the MacDonald case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The nature of the land use takings problem 
Regulatory takings involve government actions which diminish the 
usefulness or value of private property. How much detriment must a 
particular property owner suffer before his claim for fifth amendment 
compensation will be satisfied ?16 Since government, in exercising its po-
lice power, cannot be held liable for every impact on property values, 
the question whether a regulatory taking has occured becomes one of 
degree. 17 Resolution of this question requires a determination of the 
amount of impact a particular land use regulation has had on privately 
owned land. 18 
14. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). 
15. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
16. This comment generally addresses land use takings claims resulting from the effect of 
regulations that are otherwise valid exercises of the state's police power. Certainly, if a regulation 
is confiscatory in nature and serves no legitimate state interest, the private landowner's right to 
receive compensation may be heightened in a balance between the public interest and the individ-
ual interests of the landowner. But the nature of the land use takings cases is such that, even in 
the event the state has some legitimate interest in enacting a land use ordinance based on the 
state's police power, there may be times when the impact is so severe that it would be proper to 
compensate a landowner for his losses. 
17. Justice Holmes stated that: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recog-
nized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police 
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and 
due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is 
the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all 
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. 
So the question depends upon the particular facts . . . . 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
18. Note that generally, in addition to the economic impact inquiry, the takings question 
involves a balancing of public and private interests: 
In determining the validity of zoning regulations, the public interest must be 
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The Court has faced the question of regulatory impact in several 
cases, but no truly helpful principle of law has emerged. 19 The general 
rule is that a taking occurs when a regulation has "gone too far" in 
limiting a landowner's use of his land.20 The obvious difficulty with 
this approach is deciding when a regulation has "gone too far". 21 No 
formulas have been provided to help decide when a "regulation ends 
and a taking begins."22 The Court has stressed that the inquiry must 
be factual in nature and therefore must be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis.23 
weighed against the right of individual owners, and while the effect of a regulation on 
the land values is not controlling, it is a proper element to be considered, since no basis 
for the exercise of the zoning power exists if the public gain is small compared with 
individual hardships and loss. 
lOlA C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 47a (1979). 
The Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), stated: 
The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land. The determination that governmental action consti-
tutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a 
single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest. 
Although no precise rule determines when property has been taken, the question neces-
sarily requires a weighing of private and public interests. 
See also, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 
1987)(No. 85-1092). 
Despite the importance of balancing the interests, however, when the public interest is clearly 
legitimate, the severity of the economic harm should be given more emphasis. This is so because 
nearly all zoning ordinances are enacted for a legitimate purpose, and consequently, a straight 
balancing test would result in no cases where compensable damages could be awarded. Such an 
approach would never require compensation when a validly enacted ordinance lowers property 
values. Some writers advocate that the test for regulatory taking should be based on diminution in 
value (economic harm) alone. In Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Prop-
aty Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REV. 779, 804 (1976), the author concludes 
that "[ t ]he key to rationalizing these disparate tests and to repairing past distortions is to establish 
diminution in value as the single test for determining the existence of 'damage' and for signaling 
the rise of the corresponding government duty to compensate the individual." 
19. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S 104 (1978); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 
u.s. 155 (1958). 
20. Justice Holmes stated: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
21. Justice Holmes stated that "this is a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed 
of by general propositions." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). This 
statement is also cited in MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566. 
22. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Also, the Court stated that the 
inquiry "calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic." Andrus v. 
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978). 
23. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); 
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). 
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Although there is no generally applied standard, the Court has 
indicated several factors that may be helpful in the analysis. Two fac-
tors of particular significance are 1) the amount of diminution in value 
or economic impact caused by the challenged regulation, and 2) the 
regulation's effect upon the reasonable investment-backed expectations 
of the landowner. 24 These factors clearly indicate that land use takings 
cases require a determination of the economic harm caused by a regula-
tion.26 As yet, however, it is uncertain how they are to be applied or in 
what context they are most significant. 
B. The special problem of determining the allowable use of property 
in land use takings cases 
Unlike eminent domain proceedings where the government actu-
ally acquires fee title, land use regulations only limit actual or potential 
use and enjoyment of private property.26 Consequently, when land use 
ordinances are challenged, courts must ascertain the remaining value of 
the regulated property to determine the amount of economic impact 
caused by the regulation. This is done largely by determining what 
remaining use of the property the ordinance permits. If substantial use 
remains, the amount of diminution in value or the effect upon the rea-
sonable investment-backed expections of the landowner are normally 
not significant enough to warrant a takings judgment. If, on the other 
24. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
25. The Court also mentioned that the character of the rq;ulation is an important factor to 
consider. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 7·1 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). For purposes of this comment, the character of the regulation can be 
typified as a land use regulation which does not physically invade private property. 
26. Eminent domain involves the taking of private land through "actual" physical acquisition 
by the government. Inverse condemnation, on the other hand, involves an action initiated by the 
landowner alleging that the government "in effect" deprived the landowner of some value or use 
in the land. The difference is that no formal eminent domain proceedings are initiated because the 
government is not actually acquiring the property. The Court stated: "Inverse condemnation 
should be distinguished from eminent domain. Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in 
which a government asserts its authority to condemn property. Inverse condemnation is 'a short-
hand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of 
his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.' " Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980). See generally Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police 
Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL L. REV. 1 (1971). 
Also, inverse condemnation should be distinguished from the term land use takings. Inverse 
condemnation refers to the procedure by which a landowner may seek compensation for a taking. 
Land use taking refers to a series of circumstances, beginning with the enactment of a government 
regulation, that affect a landowner's use of his land and give rise to an inverse condemnation 
action. 
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hand, nearly all uses are depleted, a taking under the fifth amendment 
may exist. The question thus becomes at what point, as determined by 
the allowable use, the impact becomes severe enough to constitute a 
taking. 
C. The inherent relationship between the land use takings question 
and the problem of ripeness 
Since knowing the allowable use of regulated private land is essen-
tial to the determination of whether a taking has occurred, it follows 
that the Court must be able to measure this use with some degree of 
certainty. Almost invariably, a court must look to state or local plan-
ning commissions or zoning boards before it can make such a determi-
nation. Ordinarily, only a final disposition by such authorized bodies 
will permit a court to know the allowable usc remaining with the de-
gree of certainty needed to determine the extent to which a regulation 
has interfered with the use and enjoyment of private land.27 
In addition to being important to the takings question, a final de-
termination by a city or county regarding how a land use regulation is 
to be applied to private property is an essential prerequisite to making 
a case ripe for adjudication.28 This conclusion follows logically from the 
axiom that unless land value is actually diminished or depleted, the 
landowner has not sustained any determinable concrete injury. Without 
a final determination by government, courts cannot determine the se-
verity of regulatory impact and consequently cannot determine whether 
any concrete injury occurred.29 If no injury is alleged, a case does not 
merit adjudication. 30 
said: 
27. The Court in MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566, citing Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3108, 
Until a property owner has "obtained a final decision regarding the application of the 
zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property," "it is impossible to tell 
whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] expecta-
tion interests ha[ ve] been destroyed." 
28. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566. 
29. This is analogous to the "final order" doctrine where a final authoritative decision by an 
agency administrator is required before a claim is said to be ripe. See Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and Environmental Defense Fund v. Har-
din, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1 970). 
30. Although the ripeness doctrine stands for the proposition that a case is not worthy of 
adjudication if it is not sufficiently concrete, there are actually two bases for the doctrine. At the 
core of the doctrine is the case or controversy requirement which is constitutionally based and 
cannot be altered. Article III of the United States Constitution is generally known as providing 
that the judicial power shall extend only to such cases and controversies that are enumerated in 
the provisions of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. On the other hand, prudential con-
cerns also provide the Court with discretionary powers which are not constitutionally mandated. 
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,503 (1961); and Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936). 
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III. RECENT LAND UsE CAsEs AND THE PRoBLEM oF RIPENEss 
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles the Supreme Court recently held that where a 
government has "taken" property by a land use regulation, the land 
owner may recover damages for the time before it is finally determined 
that the regulation constitutes a taking of the property.31 Unlike previ-
ous cases, however, the question whether a taking had actually oc-
curred was not at issue. Because the California courts had assumed that 
the complaint sought damages for an uncompensated taking of all use 
of the property involved, the question of compensation was isolated as 
the only issue for the Supreme Court to address. By contrast, in both 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 
and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, the Court found 
See generally GuNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1580 (1985). 
The problem is that concreteness is not an easy threshold to define. There is no fine line 
between a case that is ripe and one that is not. For instance, in United Public Workers v. Mitch-
ell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947), the Court held that the plaintiffs case was not ripe because the 
plaintiffs had merely sought to restrain the Civil Service Commission from enforcing a statute 
prohibiting federal employees from taking part in politics. The plaintiffs had not yet violated the 
alleged unconstitutional statute although they expressed a desire to do so. However, in Adler v. 
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 ( 1952), the Court implied that the plaintiffs case was ripe 
where plaintiff taxpayers attacked a law designed to eliminate subversive persons from the public 
school system. As in Mitchell, the plaintiffs had not violated the statute in question, but they also 
had not even expressed any desire to do so. On its face, then, it seems the two cases are not 
reconcilable. In fact, Adler's case appears to be less ripe than Mitchell. But Mitchell was the one 
dismissed. 
A possible reconciliation suggested in GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1584 (1985), is 
that both cases were actually ripe enough for adjudication under article III. But since Adler was a 
state court decision involving a determination on the constitutionality of a state statute, it fell 
within the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Mitchell, on the other hand, ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a federal statute and therefore fell within the federal court's right to 
exercise discretion in abstaining from matters within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court felt 
compelled to decide the Adler case but less inclined to decide Mitchell. 
For a general discussion of the federal abstention doctrine in land use takings cases, see 
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 491, 512 
(1981). Mandelker believes that the federal courts are not likely to take jurisdiction in land use 
takings cases because they raise questions of state and local policy. He stated that the reason may 
lie in 
principles of judicial restraint that limit federal court intervention in matters of state 
and local competence, such as land use regulations. This self-imposed limitation on 
federal jurisdiction is important because plaintiffs are likely to seek a federal forum for 
inverse condemnation land use actions . . . . 
In federal courts, plaintiffs in inverse condemnation actions face a limitation on 
federal jurisdiction-the federal abstention doctrine-that reflects federal court reluc-
tance to interfere in state and local concerns. 
/d. at 512-13. 
31. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 85-
1199 (U.S. June 9, 1987). 
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that a final determination of the type and intensity of development per-
mitted by respective land use laws had not been reached. The following 
review of the two cases demonstrates why the Supreme Court did not 
reach the merits of the takings question in either case. 
A. Williamson County 
In 1973, a landowner, planning to develop his 676 acre property 
into a residential subdivision, obtained approval from the Regional 
Planning Commission of Williamson County, Tennessee, of a prelimi-
nary plat for the cluster development32 of a subdivision known as Tem-
ple Hills Country Club Estates (Temple Hills).33 Four years later, af-
ter part of the subdivision had been completed,34 the county enacted a 
more restrictive zoning ordinance. 36 In 1979, the Commission decided 
that any plats submitted requiring renewal for further development 
should be evaluated under the new zoning ordinance in effect at the 
time renewal was sought. In 1980, the Commission asked the developer 
to submit a revised preliminary plat for the remaining undeveloped 
portion of the subdivision and the Commission subsequently disap-
proved the plat because it did not comply with the newly enacted re-
strictions. The developer appealed the Commission's decision to the 
County Board of Zoning Appeals and the Board determined that the 
Commission should apply to Temple Hills the zoning ordinance and 
subdivision regulations that were in effect in 1973. 
Due to a subsequent foreclosure, the Hamilton Bank, a prior 
mortgagee, took title to the undeveloped portion of the Temple Hills 
property. Desiring to develop the property, the Bank submitted two 
preliminary plats to the Commission-the plat that had been approved 
in 1973 and a plat similar to the plat submitted by the developer in 
1980. The Commission subsequently refused to follow the decision of 
32. The Court referred to cluster zoning: "both the size and the width of individual residen-
tial lots in ... [a] development may be reduced, provided ... that the overall density of the 
entire tract remains constant-provided, that is, that an area equivalent to the total of the areas 
thus 'saved' from each individual lot is pooled and retained as common open space." Williamson, 
105 S. Ct. at 3112. 
33. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3112. 
34. Several sections of the plat, containing 212 units, were given final approval in 1979. The 
landowner had also begun building roads and installing utility lines. Further, he had spent ap-
proximately $3 million building an 18 hole golf course and another $500,000 installing sewer and 
water facilities. Jd. 
35. In 1977, the county "changed its zoning ordinance to require that calculations of allowa-
ble density exclude 10% of the total acreage to account for roads and utilities." Id. at 3113. Also, 
the number of allowable units was changed from 1.089 per acre allowed under the original ordi-
nance to just one per acre. These changes had the effect of considerably reducing the total number 
of units that could be built on the property. Id. at 3113. 
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the Board of Zoning Appeals and disallowed further development by 
disapproving both plats. 
The Bank filed suit against the Commission, its members and staff 
in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,36 alleging that 
"the commission had taken its property without just compensation"37 in 
violation of the fifth amendment. After a three-week trial, a jury found 
that the Bank had been denied the 'economically viable' use of its prop-
erty in violation of the just compensation clause. The jury awarded 
damages of $350,000 for the temporary taking of the Bank's property 
and the court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Commis-
sion to apply to Temple Hills the original zoning ordinance and subdi-
vision regulations in effect in 1973. The district court, however, subse-
quently granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the 
Commission on the taking claim, reasoning that a temporary depriva-
tion, as a matter of law, cannot constitute a taking. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the District Court's holding 
that the taking verdict could not stand, holding that a temporary denial 
of property could be a taking and was to be treated in the same manner 
as a permanent taking. The Supreme Court subsequently granted cer-
tiorari "to address the question whether federal, state, and local govern-
ments must pay money damages to a landowner whose property alleg-
edly has been 'taken' temporarily by the application of government 
regulations."38 The Court did not reach the merits of this issue, how-
ever, concluding that the Bank's claim was "premature" and remand-
ing the case to the district court for further consideration. 
In reaching its conclusion to remand on ripeness grounds, the 
Court based its analysis on the following two factors: 1) Hamilton 
Bank's failure to seek variances from the zoning ordinance and subdivi-
sion regulations; and 2) the Bank's failure to seek compensation 
through a statutorily provided inverse condemnation scheme. 
36. /d. at 3114. The civil rights statute provides a civil action for deprivation of rights: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the person injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for 
redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
37. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3114. 
38. /d. at 3116. 
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1. Failure to seek variances 
In finding that the Hamilton Bank's claim was not ripe for adjudi-
cation, the Court observed that a regulatory takings claim "is not ripe 
until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations 
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations 
to the property at issue."89 The Court noted that in this case the Bank 
had not sought any variances from either the Board of Zoning Appeals 
or from the Planning Commission.40 Approval of the variances would 
have allowed it to develop the property according to its proposed plat. 
The Court held that "until the Commission determines that no vari-
ances will be granted, it is impossible for the jury to find ... whether 
[the Bank] 'will be unable to derive economic benefit' from the land."41 
2. Failure to seek compensation through the statutory scheme 
In addition to finding that the Bank had failed to seek variances 
from the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations, the Court also 
found that the developer did not exhaust all compensatory procedures 
available under Tennessee law. Noting that a state's "taking" action is 
not complete in the constitutional sense 'unless or until the state fails to 
provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy ,'42 the Court held that in 
this case the state's alleged "taking" could not be complete until the 
Bank had followed the inverse condemnation procedures established by 
state law.48 Since the Bank failed to show that the inverse condemna-
tion procedure was unavailable or inadequate, the Court dismissed the 
land use takings issue as premature." 
B. MacDonald 
In 1975, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates (MacDonald) submitted 
a tentative subdivision map to the Planning Commission of Yolo 
County, California. Under MacDonald's proposal, the largely agricul-
tural property was to be subdivided into 159 residential lots. The 
county planning commission and the county board of supervisors re-
jected the proposed subdivision plan on the grounds that it failed to 
provide 1) adequate public street access, 2) sewer services, 3) water 
39. /d. at 3117. 
40. The Court noted that the Board had power to grant certain variances from the zoning 
ordinance and that the Commission had power to grant variances from the subdivision regulations. 
Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3118. 
41. Id. at 3119. 
42. Id. at 3121. 
43. Id. at 3122. 
44. Id. 
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supplies and 4) police protection. 411 MacDonald subsequently filed an 
action in California Superior Court seeking declaratory and monetary 
relief. MacDonald alleged that the county's decision to reject the plan 
in effect restricted land zoned for residential use to agricultural use and 
thereby "appropriated the entire economic use"46 of the property for 
the "sole purpose of providing a public, open-space buffer."47 The trial 
court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, holding that MacDonald's 
factual allegations were insufficient to state a takings claim and that 
monetary damages were foreclosed by California law!8 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court denied MacDonald's petition for hearing. Mac-
Donald then perfected an appeal to the United States Supreme Court 
on the "question whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation 
is constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving regulatory 
takings .... "49 Similar to its result in Williamson one year earlier, 
however, the Court again did not reach the merits of the takings issue 
because of ripeness problems. In a 5 to 4 decision, the court affirmed 
the demurrer to MacDonald's allegations. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reasoned that a Court 
must first "know what use, if any, may be made of the affected prop-
erty" before the constitutionality of the government action can be deter-
mined. 50 He articulated: 
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essen-
tial prerequisite to its [determination] is a final and authoritative de-
termination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted 
on the subject property. A Court cannot determine whether a regula-
tion has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes.111 
While noting that MacDonald had submitted a subdivision propo-
45. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (1986). 
46. /d. at 2563. 
47. /d. at 2564. 
48. In California, where the MacDonald case arose, there are no administrative or statutory 
remedies available to landowners. The California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), stated that a landowner who challenges the 
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance may not "sue in inverse condemnation and thereby trans-
mute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent 
domain must be paid." /d. at 273, 28, 375. The U.S. Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980), referring to the California Supreme Court decision, observed that "[t]he 
sole remedies for such a taking . . . are mandamus and declaratory judgment." Thus, landowners 
in states like California are especially burdened by the restrictive nature of land use regulations 
because of the limited availability of adequate remedies. 
49. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565. 
50. Id. at 2567. 
51. /d. at 2566. 
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sal and had received a negative response from the County Board of 
Supervisors, the majority remained unpersuaded that the Board had is-
sued a " 'final, definitive position' " 52 regarding how it would apply the 
zoning regulations to the farmland in question. Consequently, the 
Court declined to reach the question whether the Constitution requires 
a monetary remedy to redress some regulatory takings because the 
Court was "uncertain whether the property at issue had been taken."53 
The Court stated "the holdings of both courts below leave open the 
possibility that some development [would have been] permitted 
"54 
C. Distinguishing the Williamson and MacDonald ripeness 
approaches to land use takings cases 
The MacDonald majority, in reaching its conclusion that a final 
determination of allowable use had not been made, relied in significant 
part on the analysis of the Williamson case. It is important to note that 
the Court also relied on two other fairly recent land use decisions. 55 
While these cases are significant, however, they lack a distinctive fea-
ture present in both Williamson and MacDonald which makes com-
parison of these latter two cases especially appropriate. 56 Williamson 
and MacDonald also contain subtle factual and analytical differences 
as well. This comment highlights these differences to show that the 
Court improperly applied the ripeness analysis of Williamson to the 
critically different facts of MacDonald. 
1. In MacDonald, there was a final decision 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in MacDonald, cited lan-
guage in Williamson recalling that a " 'final decision regarding the 
application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations' " to 
property is needed before the courts can " 'tell whether the land re-
tain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether (existing] expectation 
interests ha[ ve] been destroyed.' " 117 He found that the landowner in 
52. /d. at 2568. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. 
55. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (l98l); and Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
56. In both Agins, 447 U.S. at 255, and San Diego, 450 U.S. at 621, the developer had not 
submitted a development plan for approval. Absent an application for development evidencing the 
landowner's expectation interests, no concrete controversy alleging an impact on that interest could 
exist. In Williamson and MacDonald, however, the developers did submit plans for approval 
giving rise to a different type of ripeness analysis unique to the two cases. 
57. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566. 
375] RIPENESS IN TAKING ISSUES 389 
MacDonald had "yet to receive the Board's final definitive position re-
garding how it [would] apply the regulation at issue to the particular 
land in question."118 From this, he concluded quite summarily from the 
California Court of Appeal's holding and without considering the pro-
cedural significance of the demurrer sustained by the California Supe-
rior Court, that some development might have been permitted had the 
landowner submitted a meaningful development plan.119 
In his dissent, Justice White points out that the Superior Court of 
California, in sustaining a demurrer to the landowner's complaint, had 
accepted the landowner's allegation that "all economically beneficial 
residential uses were foreclosed by the [government's] actions."80 Al-
though the Superior Court refused to accept the allegation that all 
"nonagricultural purposes explicitly allowed in agricultural zones 
under the county and city codes"81 would be precluded from develop-
ment, it did accept as true the "allegation that the property had effec-
tively been rezoned agricultural. ... "82 Stated differently, while the 
landowner was free to seek nonagricultural uses "explicitly allowed in 
agricultural zones"88 the Superior Court impliedly admitted that a final 
decision had been made with regard to the property's development as a 
residential subdivision. Because the city designated the property in 
question as an "Agricultural Preserve or Reserve,"84 the land was ef-
fectively zoned agricultural preventing all residential development not 
consistent with agricultural zoning. Thus, the clear implication is that 
it would have been futile for the landowner to submit alternative resi-
dential plans. 
2. The question of variances 
In Williamson, the Court's unanimous decision required Hamil-
ton Bank to seek all available variances from the zoning ordinance and 
subdivision regulations as a prerequisite to alleging a concrete contro-
versy.811 The Court assumed that had the variances been submitted, the 
Bank would have been allowed to develop its property according to its 
proposed plan. In MacDonald, on the other hand, the developer was 
effectively precluded from seeking any variances. Because the Superior 
58. Jd. at 2568. 
59. /d. 
60. Jd. at 2570. 
61. /d. at 2566. 
62. /d. at 2569. 
63. Jd. at 2566. 
64. /d. at 2568. 
65. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3117. 
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Court concluded that all residential uses would be "foreclosed,"66 it fol-
lows that any attempts to seek variances would also have been futile. 
It thus appears that in Williamson, the Bank's attempt to seek 
variances related to an existing residential plan would have satisfied the 
Court's requirement for a final land use determination.67 Although the 
Bank faced the additional hurdle of exhausting all statutory remedies,68 
it appears that once variances were sought, the Court would have oth-
erwise been able to address the takings question. In MacDonald, how-
ever, the Court required the developer to apply for meaningful alterna-
tives to the existing plan and to search for other "less intensive"69 uses 
even though there was little question that his proposed residential plan 
had been completely rejected by the local zoning authorities. Thus, the 
MacDonald result extends the ripeness approach beyond the need to 
exhaust existing remedies and acquire a final land use decision. Such 
an extension represents a considerable gloss on the Williamson analy-
sis.70 Taken to its extreme, the impact of the Court's holding in 
66. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2570. 
67. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3118. 
68. As previously noted, in Tennessee, where the Williamson case arose, compensatory reme-
dies were statutorily provided. In California, where the MacDonald case arose, they were not. 
The resulting difference in the analysis, in part, is that the Court in Williamson required that 
existing remedies be exhausted before the claim could be adjudicated. In MacDonald, on the other 
hand, the Court stated that even in the absence of statutory remedies, all possible alternatives, 
including the application of plans for alternative or less intensive development, must be sought to 
determine the allowable use of the land. 
Another way to look at this distinction is that the Court in Williamson was concerned more 
or less with whether all remedies had been exhausted, whereas in MacDonald, the real question 
was whether the land use decision was a final one. Finality in this context means that a definitive 
land use decision concerning the allowable use of the land is required to determine whether any 
viable use remains. The finality requirement is "concerned with whether the initial decision-
maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury." 
Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3120. 
Note also that the question of finality was discussed in both Williamson and MacDonald. 
However, the need for exhaustion of statutory remedies was merely an additional factor weighing 
in favor of the decision in Williamson which was not a factor in MacDonald. Since the William-
son decision was unanimous, and the MacDonald decision was split 5 to 4, notwithstanding other 
factual differences, it seems clear that the landowner's failure to exhaust available statutory reme-
dies was a dispositive factor in the Court's unanimous decision in Williamson. 
69. Expressed in the Court's opinion in MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2568, is the view that 
some development would have been allowed had the landowner submitted a less intensive but 
meaningful plan for development. The Court stated "the holdings of both courts below leave open 
the possibility that some development will be permitted ... " and that a "meaningful application 
has not yet been made." 
70. In MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2561, the Court overlooked another factual difference be-
tween that case and Williamson, 105 S. Ct at 3108. In MacDonald, the dispute did not arise out 
of a change in zoning. Instead, the problem was that the county refused approval of a residential 
development plan on four specific grounds in spite of the property's residential zoning designation. 
The distinction is that, in MacDonald, the county's specific actions were attacked; whereas in 
Williamson, the general effect of an otherwise valid change in the zoning ordinance was 
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MacDonald would force landowners to submit repeated applications 
for development (applications which in many instances landowners 
would have no intention of pursuing or which they knew were futile) 
before isolating the exact uses allowable by local zoning authorities. 
This is clearly not the message of Williamson.71 
questioned. 
This may be significant in explaining the result of the MacDonald case. It could be that the 
Court was unwilling to overturn a specific governmental exercise of its police power without sub-
stantial factual support. Because the lower court granted a demurrer, and because the plaintiff had 
not properly pleaded facts sufficient to establish a taking, the Court may not have had sufficient 
facts to decide the case. Thus it may be that the Court merely exercised its discretionary powers, 
not its article III powers, in concluding that the claim was not ripe. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 503 (1961); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936). See generally GuNTHER, CoN-
STITUTIONAL LAW, 1580 (1985). 
In support for this conclusion, it could be said that the case was sufficiently concrete under 
the article III case or controversy requirements because an actual controversy regarding the al-
leged rejection of the development plan did exist. The landowner submitted a plan for approval 
which was allegedly denied for the sole purpose of providing a public, open-space buffer. A final 
land use decision did exist. A controversy, however small or large, began once the plan was re-
jected, thereby reducing the value of the property and affecting the expectation interests of the 
landowner. Therefore, it could be argued that a real controversy existed in the MacDonald case. 
Concededly, the question remained whether the plaintiff could show that the economic impact 
was severe enough to constitute a compensable taking. But this went towards the plaintiffs burden 
of proving the elements of the takings claim. The factors necessary to determine the amount of 
economic impact caused by the ordinance went to the merits of the takings claim, not to whether 
there was a controversy at all. An economic impact creating a real controversy exists whether or 
not the impact can be measured by the courts; the inability to measure the impact does not mean 
that no impact occurred. 
Further, the Court obviously realized the significant impact any final decision may have had 
on landowners and local governments, and may have determined that a decision of this nature 
should be post paned until a case with better facts was presented. The importance of the issue was 
explained by the California Supreme Court in Agins. It stated that awarding compensation in 
land use takings cases may cause a chilling effect on land use regulation programs. The court 
stated that a monetary remedy "will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the imple-
mentation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures which are less stringent, 
more traditional, and fiscally safe." 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377, 
(quoting Hall, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law1, 28 
HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1597 (1977)). Additionally, the Court may be waiting for lower courts to 
decide the issue, or may want to look at this issue several more times before deciding it. Many 
landmark cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1 954), were not only argued 
twice, but before reaching the merits, the Court postponed deciding on the issue several times due 
to the potential impact the decision may have on the nation. The land use takings cases may fit 
comfortably into such a category. 
71. In his objection to the majority decision in MacDonald, Justice White stated: "Nothing 
in our cases suggests that the decisionmaker's definitive position may be determined only from 
explicit denials of property-owner applications for development. Nor do these cases suggest that 
repeated applications and denials are necessary to pinpoint that position." MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2571. He also goes on to say "[a]lthough a landowner must pursue reasonably available avenues 
that might allow relief, it need not, I believe, take patently fruitless measures." /d. at 2572. 
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IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CouRT's RIPENEss 
APPROACH 
MacDonald extends the ripeness approach of previous land use 
takings cases too far. Indeed, in the absence of any existing statutory 
remedies or possible resolution by variance, the Court required more 
than just a final decision. When a landowner applies to develop his 
land in a manner consistent with applicable zoning requirements, and 
the zoning authority subsequently denies the application, the MacDon-
ald approach requires that the landowner must still submit other plans 
for less intensive use. 72 The decision, as precedence, creates practical 
problems which may effectively prevent all landowners from having 
their takings claims adjudicated at all. 
By requiring landowners to submit less intensive development 
plans following the rejection of an otherwise legitimate proposal, the 
majority in MacDonald makes a radical departure from the Court's 
previous takings and ripeness analysis. The Court's new approach 
raises the following practical questions for landowners: 1) how will a 
court decide whether a land use decision is a final decision; 2) will a 
zoning authority's subsequent approval of a plan for less intensive use 
constitute a waiver of the right to appeal a previous unfavorable deci-
sion; and 3) what impact will the Court's holding have on landowners 
who have no incentive to apply for less intensive uses? 
A. The problem of finality 
In MacDonald, the Yolo County Planning Commission and the 
Board of Supervisors rejected a subdivision development plan submitted 
by the plaintiff for the building of 159 housing units. Nevertheless, the 
Court declared that the county's decision was not final because the 
county might have allowed some viable use had the landowner submit-
ted alternative plans for approval.73 The irony of this result is that the 
72. Citing a California Court of Appeal decision, the Court in MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 
2565, stated "the refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the 
landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. Accordingly, the com-
plaint fails to state a cause of action." Although the Court mentioned that futile reapplications for 
development are not necessary, it also observed that "the holdings of both courts below leave open 
the possibility that some development will be permitted," and that the "the implication is not that 
future applications would be futile, but that a meaningful application has not yet been made." I d. 
at 2568, n.8. 
73. The Court relied upon an interpretation of the lower court holdings to say that some 
meaningful use of the land would have been approved had the landowner submitted them for 
approval. But the Court did not indicate, or even consider, how much reasonable effort a land-
owner must put forth to get his plan approved, or how many times alternative plans must be 
submitted. 
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actual land use decision was a complete disposition of the original plan. 
If, however, rejection of the landowner's original plan by the county is 
not considered final, what is a final decision? 
The Court states in MacDonald that the land use decision must 
be final, but it suggests the decision must be final with respect to the 
allowable use. 74 Although the Court states it must know how the regu-
lation is to be applied, it seems that only a decision in favor of a plan 
will furnish the information the Court requires to determine the re-
maining allowable use of the land. Another rejected plan will merely 
duplicate the existing problem. Only by having the landowner submit 
and receive approval of an alternative plan may the approving commis-
sion rest on a concrete and final position regarding the applicant's al-
lowed interest in using the land.711 Thus, the implication in MacDonald 
is that a plan must be approved before the land use decision is deemed 
final. 
Since the controversy in MacDonald was that the government had 
effectively taken the landowner's property by denying some potential 
use of the land, it seems odd that the Court would require an approval 
of some use to determine whether a taking has occurred. As mentioned, 
the Court implied that approval is necessary to determine the amount 
of use allowed. The resulting irony is that an approved plan, not a 
rejected plan, becomes the source of a legal claim. Yet, under the tak-
ings clause, a cause of action is one that alleges a deprivation of, not a 
successful application for, land use. 
B. The waiver and mootness problem 
In the event a less intensive plan is submitted by a landowner and 
subsequently approved, the landowner may still not be afforded an ad-
judication of the takings issue. Because the courts may assume the land-
owner is receiving exactly what he asked for by virtue of the approved 
plan, the courts may in effect waive the land use takings action com-
74. The Court in MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566, quoting Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at .3124, 
stated: 
[The] resolution of [the takings] question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis 
of the effect the Commission's application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision reg-
ulations had on the value of property and investment backed profit expectation. That 
effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will 
be applied to respondent's property. 
75. The Supreme Court's actions in MacDonald can be defended, if not on its reasoning, 
then on its design. The Court needs a decision that will help it determine how much use is 
permissible under the city's restrictions. Only a decision in favor of a plan will help the Court 
determine the allowable use permitted by the regulation. A series of rejected plans may get closer 
to the allowable use, but only an approved plan will show what use is actually permissible with 
respect to the landowner's intentions to develop the property. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2561. 
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pletely. The presumption will be that no taking could occur since the 
landowner will get what he wants and be able to make use of his land. 
Additionally, once a landowner's plan is approved, a concrete con-
troversy alleging a taking of private property may no longer exist. In 
other words, the landowner's complaint may be moot. In contrast to the 
ripeness doctrine, the mootness doctrine holds that a case cannot be ad-
judicated once a controversy is over. Thus, if a plan is approved by the 
government, and the landowner is allowed to make use of his land, it 
would seem that the controversy has ended. Further, it may seem un-
reasonable for a landowner to allege that his property has been taken 
when in fact the government has just allowed him to make use of his 
property. The problem is that a landowner may cross the threshold of 
ripeness only to find himself in the realm of mootness. 
Under the Court's reasoning, a claim would be unripe until a land 
use decision is final, but as soon as a decision is final with respect to 
the allowable use, the claim would immediately become moot. There-
fore, a landowner alleging a substantial loss caused by the regulation, 
despite approval of a plan, may be denied a chance to have his case 
adjudicated at all.'6 
C. A landowner may have no incentive to submit less intensive plans 
From a practical standpoint, the Court created a significant bur-
den on landowners by requiring them to submit additional less inten-
sive plans for approval. First, the landowner will have to hire more 
architects, engineers, and landscape architects to revise the existing de-
velopment plans and to provide new building plans and specifications. 
In almost every instance, this process will be time consuming and ex-
pensive. Furthermore, with the original plan rejected, the landowner 
76. On the other hand, it can be argued that such a claim should not be ripe in some circum-
stances. For example, if a landowner, like Agins, was allowed to build five residences for a sub-
stantial profit, as was the actual case, he should not be able to recover under the takings clause. 
The argument is that no taking under the fifth amendment could have occurred if he was able to 
make valuable economic use of his land. Also, note that subsequent to the legal action in William-
son, I OS S. Ct. at 3108, the bank was also able to make use of its property for a profit. 
But these cases raise the corollary question whether a partial taking is a taking under the 
fifth amendment. Since the original takings question is one of degree, it seems to follow that even a 
partial taking can be a taking if the degree of impact, or diminution in value, is severe enough. 
Also, since there will always be some value left in a property no matter how restrictive the land 
use ordinance may be, short of total acquisition, it seems inevitable that all land use takings claims 
will involve only a partial taking. Further, one can infer from the recent Supreme Court cases that 
a total deprivation of land use is not necessarily a prerequisite to a compensable taking because of 
their emphasis on the economic impact and reasonable investment-backed expectations. Therefore, 
it is possible that a landowner should be able to receive compensation even if he is allowed to 
make some viable use of his property. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 
55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, !987)(No. 85-1092). 
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will be forced to revise his budget, re-evaluate his expectations, and 
alter his vision in developing his land. 77 
Secondly, there may be circumstances where landowners will not 
be able to profit by submitting and following through with an alterna-
tive plan. In fact, by changing development plans, a landowner may 
subject himself to potential bankruptcy. He may be forced to apply for 
some unwanted or hastily planned development just to satisfy the 
court's requirements. It seems unreasonable for a landowner to have to 
change the scope and size of development for the sole purpose of seek-
ing a remedy under the law. A landowner may have no intention of 
pursuing an alternative development plan and it may be entirely 
against his interest to pursue such a course of action. 
In Williamson, for example, the developer had already completed 
a tract of houses and installed an 18-hole golf course at the time the 
Hamilton Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. 78 During that time, the 
County revised the ordinances. But even had the developer maintained 
possession and rights to the land, a subsequent reduction in the number 
of housing units allowed may have reduced his profits, or may have 
caused him to incur a substantial loss. In such situations, requiring the 
landowner to apply for less intensive development would be against his 
interest altogether. 
Furthermore, a developer desiring to invest in major construction, 
such as a nuclear power plant, may have no incentive to make use of 
his land in any other fashion. 79 Certainly, the San Diego Gas and Elec-
tric Company had no legitimate business interest in using the land for 
agricultural purposes. Yet, the Court would have the developer submit 
a radically different plan to conform with a subsequently enacted ordi-
nance whether or not he has any intention of following through with 
the plan.80 
77. Although a landowner has no absolute right to build without approval by the appropriate 
land use authority, such efforts, in this case, are required merely to challenge the land use deci-
sion. These efforts are procedural in nature and are prerequisites to asserting a claim that satisfies 
the Court's ripeness approach. 
78. 105 S. Ct. at 3112. 
79. This was the case in San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621 (1981), supra note 10. 
80. The paradox is that the case asserting the issue may remain nonjusticiable. Requiring a 
landowner to submit less intensive, meaningful plans after an existing plan has been rejected 
imposes a tremendous burden on landowners. Not only is the landowner faced with the uncer-
tainty of not knowing at what point a land use decision will be deemed final, he is also burdened 
with additional costs and risks which will often discourage or prohibit him from seeking alterna-
tive development. To force a landowner to pursue an alternative development plan may result in 
postponing or preventing a judicial remedy altogether. Given that a landowner may find it against 
his interest to submit an alternative plan, he may be unable to satisfy the Court's requirements. 
Thus, a landowner who faces a potential loss in his expectation interests may never be able to 
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V. CoNCLUSION 
Land use takings cases require a determination of the economic 
harm caused by regulation. Economic harm is determined in large mea-
sure by knowing the allowable use remaining in the property after a 
particular land use restriction is applied. In two recent Supreme Court 
cases, Williamson and MacDonald, the question of economic harm in a 
land use takings context was presented. The Court, however, did not 
reach the merits of the takings issue in either case because no final 
decision regarding the allowable use had been made. 
In finding the cases to be unripe for adjudication, the Court in 
Williamson required a final decision with respect to the allowable uses 
under an existing development plan, while in MacDonald, the Court in 
essence required a landowner to seek approval of less intensive uses 
even though a final decision effectively rejecting ~n existing develop-
ment plan was made by the local land use authority. 
The result in MacDonald inevitably creates practical problems for 
landowners affected by land use regulations. By requiring landowners 
to submit alternative development plans for approval, even though the 
costs and risks of pursuing such a new course of action may be great, 
the Court's approach unduly burdens private land development. The 
Court's approach also leaves landowners uncertain as to when a land 
use decision is to be considered final for appeal and imposes additional 
costs and risks. The effect of the Court's approach will be that many 
valid fifth amendment claims by landowners whose interest in land de-
receive just compensation, whether the Constitution requires it or not. 
A practical solution to these problems might be to shift the burden of showing the allowable 
use of property from the landowner to the government. The government is in the unique position 
to know what uses may be allowed under the ordinances since it presumably enacted them in 
accordance with some legitimate state interest in mind. The government has access to the records 
of the meetings in which it made the changes to the existing land use ordinances, and it can restate 
the purposes for which the ordinances were changed to help show the extent of the land use 
restrictions. Further, since the government represents the community's interests, it is in the posi-
tion to discern the needs that were considered in enacting the regulations. With this information, 
the government can more or less accurately determine what uses were specifically intended to be 
allowed on the property by the ordinances to fulfill its land use objectives. 
When a restrictive land use ordinance is enacted, it is frequently detrimental to landowners 
and beneficial to the community. Thus, it would be fair, once a plan is rejected and legal action is 
taken, for the Court to require the government, on behalf of the community, to show the use 
permitted by the ordinance. The landowner is already being subjected to potential hardship by 
virtue of the restrictive regulation and its impact upon the use of his land. He should not be 
required to face additional hardships in order to seek constitutionally mandated compensation. 
This is especially true where the government has not provided any administrative or statutory 
remedies, as in California. Most importantly, this would provide the Court with the information it 
needs to reach the merits of the takings issue. 
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velopment are impacted by government regulation may continue to be 
unjustly prohibited from adjudication by the ripeness doctrine. 
junji Shimazaki 
